We study the second-order asymptotics of covert communication over binary-input Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs) for three different metrics of covertness. When covertness is measured in terms of the relative entropy between the channel output distributions induced with and without communication, we characterize the exact second-order asymptotics of the number of bits that can be reliably transmitted with a probability of error less than and a relative entropy less than δ. When covertness is measured in terms of the variational distance between the channel output distributions or in terms of the probability of missed detection for fixed probability of false alarm, we establish the exact first-order asymptotics and bounds on the second-order asymptotics. The main conceptual contribution of this paper is to clarify how the choice of a covertness metric impacts the information-theoretic limits of the number of covert and reliable bits. The main technical contribution of the underlying results is a detailed analysis of probability of existence of a code satisfying the reliability and covert criteria.
I. INTRODUCTION
While most information-theoretic security works to date have revolved around the issues of confidentiality and authentication [3] , [16] , [14] , the growing concern around mass communication surveillance programs has reignited interest for investigating the covertness of communications, also known as Low Probability of Detection (LPD). In LPD problems, the objective is to hide the presence of communication and not necessarily to prevent information leakage about the messages transmitted. Following the analysis of LPD with space-time codes [11] , recent works have established the information-theoretic limits of covert communications over noisy channel [2] , [15] . In particular, building upon concepts from steganography [6] , [15] , [2] has proved the existence of a "square-root law" for covert communication, which essentially states that no more than O( √ n) bits can be communicated covertly over n channel uses of a memoryless channel.
The square-root law of covert communication has been refined in several follow-up works [7] ; in particular, the informationtheoretic limits are now known for classical discrete and Gaussian memoryless channels [5] , [23] , classical-quantum channels [22] , [19] , and multiple access channels [1] , when covertness is measured in terms of the relative entropy between the channel output distributions induced with and without communication. Note that the choice of relative entropy as a metric for covertness is guided in part by the natural connection between relative entropy and information-theoretic metrics, such as entropy and mutual information, which have been largely explored in the context of information-theoretic security [12] .
The contribution of the present paper is twofold. First, as an attempt to develop operational characterizations of covertness, we study the information-theoretic limits of covert communication for alternative metrics, including variational distance, and probability of missed detection. Second, motivated by the likely time-limited nature of covert communications, we make a first step towards a finite transmission length analysis and extend the first-order analysis of information-theoretic limits to secondorder asymptotics. The specific results developed in the present paper focus on binary-input DMCs to simplify analytical expressions and are the following.
• We characterize the exact second-order asymptotics of the maximum number of reliable and covert bits that can be transmitted with average error probability 1 2 and relative entropy δ between channel output distributions with and without communication (Theorem 1); this corrects an unfortunate error in the conference version [20] , in which we claimed erroneous second-order asymptotics, and generalizes known results about first-order asymptotics [5] , [23] .
• We characterize the exact first-order asymptotics of the maximum number of reliable and covert bits that can be transmitted with average error probability 1 2 and variational distance δ between channel output distributions with and without communication; we also develop bounds for the second-order asymptotics (Theorem 2).
• Finally, we characterize the exact first-order asymptotics of the maximum number of reliable and covert bits that can be transmitted with average error probability 1 2 and probability of missed detection 1 − α − δ when α is the adversary's probability of false alarm; we again develop bounds for the second-order asymptotics (Theorem 3). The second-order asymptotics obtained with a relative entropy metric for covertness are what could have been expected by extrapolating the results of channel coding in the finite length regime [17] to the first-order asymptotics of covert communication [5] , [23] ; however, the proof requires specific techniques beyond those used to study the first-order asymptotics. First, the achievability proof relies on Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) codes [4] , which can be viewed as a highly structured form of constant composition codes, instead of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random codes. Second, the optimal This work was presented in part at the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory [20] . This work was supported by NSF under award TWC 1527387.
coding scheme identified in [5] exploits a code with a bin structure, in which each bin forms a reliability code for the legitimate channel indexed by the secret key, while the overall code forms a resolvability code for the adversary's channel. To guarantee the positive probability of existence of a code with the desired characteristics, we resort to concentration of measure inequalities such as McDiarmid's Inequality and carefully analyze the probability of error. We point out that our current results only identify the second-order asymptotics for the number of transmitted message bits and do not characterize the second-order asymptotics for the number of key bits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally introduce the model of covert communication and state our main results. In Section III, we develop a series of general results that form the basis of our analysis of covert communication. In Section IV-A, Section IV-B, and Section IV-C, we exploit the results of Section III to study a relative entropy metric, variational distance metric, and probability of missed-detection metric for covertness, respectively. In Section VI, we conclude the paper with a discussion of possible further extensions and improvements.
II. MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS

A. Notation
Throughout the paper, log and exp should be understood in base e. Moreover, random variables are denoted with upper case letters, e.g. X, while their realization are denoted with lower case letters, e.g., x. The distribution of a random variable such as X is denoted by P X . Calligraphic letters are used for sets, e.g., X , and boldface fonts are used for vectors e.g., x. For two integers a and b, if a b, we define a, b {a, a + 1, · · · , b − 1, b}; otherwise a, b ∅. For any distribution P over X , P ⊗n denotes the product distribution over X n , i.e., P ⊗n (x) n i=1 P (x i ). For two distributions P and Q over the same set X , we define the quantities
T ⊂X :P (T ) α Q(T ) (optimal probability of missed detection).
The notation P Q means that P is absolutely continuous with respect to (w.r.t.) Q, i.e., if Q(x) = 0 for some x ∈ X , then P (x) = 0. A DMC (X , W Y |X , Y) consists of a finite input alphabet X , a finite output alphabet Y, and a transition probability W Y |X where W Y |X (y|x) indicates the probability of obtaining y at the output given that x is transmitted at the input. For a DMC (X , W Y |X , Y) and two distributions P X and Q Y on X and Y, we define
and for any γ > 0,
Moreover, given codewords
∈ X M and a uniform random variable W ∈ 1, M , P W XY denotes the joint distribution induced on (W, X, Y ), i.e.,
For any discrete random variable A, let µ A min a:P(A=a)>0 P(A = a). Finally, for x ∈ {0, 1} n , wt(x) denotes the weight of x defined as |{i ∈ 1, n : x i = 1}|. 
B. Model and main results
We consider the situation illustrated in Fig. 1 , in which a legitimate transmitter communicates with a legitimate receiver over a DMC (X , W Y |X , Y), in the presence of an adversary who observes communication through another DMC (X , W Z|X , Z), where X , Y and Z are assumed to be finite. Furthermore, in order to simplify the analytical expressions of the results, we assume in the sequel that X = {0, 1}, where 0 is an "innocent symbol" corresponding to the expected input of the channel if no communication were taking place. The extension beyond binary-inputs is briefly outlined in Section VI. We also denote the output distribution induced by each input symbol by
where it is assumed that Q 1 Q 0 , P 1 P 0 and Q 1 = Q 0 . These assumptions are the "natural" regime for covert communication and other cases have been investigated in [5, Section V] . Moreover, for η ∈ [0, 1], we define Π η as the Bernoulli(η) distribution on X , P η ηP 0 + (1 − η)P 1 and Q η ηQ 0 + (1 − η)Q 1 . The objective is for the transmitter to communicate a uniformly distributed message W ∈ 1, M with a small probability of error while ensuring low probability of detection from the adversary. The communication may be assisted by a uniformly distributed shared secret key S ∈ 1, K . A formal description of a code is as follows.
Definition 1.
A code of length n consists of an encoder/decoder pair
which induces the distribution P Z at the adversary's channel output, defined by
A code is -reliable, if the pair (f, φ) is such that
Moreover, an -reliable code defined by (f, φ) is
• an (M, K, n, , δ) V code, if it satisfies
• an (M, K, n, , δ, α) β code, if if it satisfies
The maximum number of messages that can be transmitted by an (M, K, n, , δ) D , (M, K, n, , δ) V , and (M, K, n, , δ, α) β code is denoted by M * D (n, , δ), M * V (n, , δ), and M * β (n, , δ, α), respectively. We point out that the definition of the probability of error in (15) differs from previous works [23] , [5] ; we ask that the average probability of error be small for any choice of the key S. This more stringent condition not only captures a perhaps more practical requirement, but also greatly simplifies our converse analysis. Also note that the three metrics for covertness in (16)- (18) have different operational meanings. When enforcing β α (Q ⊗n 0 , P Z ) 1−α−δ for a fixed probability of false alarm α, one implicitly assumes that the adversary is known to optimize its detection at a specific point of its Receiver Operation Characteristic (ROC) curve. In contrast, when enforcing
for any probability of false alarm α, one essentially wishes to enforce covertness irrespective of the exact operating point on the adversary's ROC curve. Finally, since
by Pinsker's Inequality, the constraint D P Z Q ⊗n 0 δ is more stringent than when using variatonal distance, but otherwise has the same significance. 1 The relations between the metrics for covertness immediately lead to the following ordering of the maximum number of covert bits.
Our main results in Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 characterize the maximum number of reliable and covert bits defined above as function of the channel characteristics and the block length n. In all cases, the first and second terms behave as Θ (n 
with
This optimal message length is obtained with a first-order optimal number of key bits
where ρ > 0 can be arbitrarily small and
and
where D P and V P are as in (21) and U P V P + D 2 P . This message length is obtained with a number of key bits
where ρ > 0 can be arbitrarily small.
and log M * β (n, , δ, α)
This message length is obtained with a number of key bits
1 See also the discussion in [5, Appendix A].
We illustrate these different results with a simple numerical example. We consider the situation in which (X , W Y |X , Y) and (X , W Z|X , Z) are Binary Symmetric Channels (BSCs) with cross-over probability p m = 0.25 and p w = 0.33, respectively, and = 10 −2 , δ = 5 · 10 −2 , and α = 0.2. As shown in Fig. 2 , the choice of the covertness metric results in different number of bits, which of course raises the question of which number to settle on. We argue that M * V (n, , δ) is the number to focus on since total variation distance satisfies two desirable properties: it is directly connected to the operation of the adversary, through the inequality α + β 1 − V P Z , Q ⊗n 0 , and it does not presume any knowledge about the exact operating point on the advesary's ROC curve. Remark 1. It is not straightforward to find the optimal throughput for covert communication, as defined in [23] , [5] , from our results. The reason is that our second-order asymptotics include an O(log n) term that depends on and δ, and for which we do not characterize the behavior as and δ tend to zero. However, for the covert metrics we consider, one can check that second and third order terms are negligible, and the optimal throughput is the pre-factor in the first-order term. Before we detail the achievability and converse proofs in the next sections, we provide here a high-level sketch of the proofs. Following [5] , the coding scheme in the achievability proof consists of M K randomly generated codewords x sw with s ∈ 1, K and w ∈ 1, M . The code is designed such that the following properties hold: (P1) the codebook {x sw } (s,w)∈ 1,K × 1,M forms a resolvability code for the channel (X , W Z|X , Z) approximating Q ⊗n 0 ; (P2) for every s ∈ 1, K , the sub-codebook {x sw } w∈ 1,M forms a reliability code for the channel (X , W Y |X , Y) with an average probability of error . The analysis does not follow from standard arguments for two reasons. First, if the codewords are generated according to an i.i.d. distribution, we do not obtain the optimal dispersion; instead, we resort to PPM codes [4] . Second, one cannot ensure (P2) by merely expurgating some of the sub-codebooks, since this expurgation may change the output distribution on Z n induced by the code; we address this by carefully analyzing the probability of error and using concentration of measure results such as McDiarmid's Inequality. The converse proof adapts arguments from [17] to the case of covert communication.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATIONS WITH GENERIC COVERTNESS QUASI-METRIC
In this section, we develop results for a generic covertness metric, which will be specialized to the three metrics highlighed in Definition 1 in Section IV-A, Section IV-B, and Section IV-C. This organization allows us to handle separately the part of the analysis that depends solely on the code structure and not on the exact metric choice. Specifically, throughout this section, we consider an arbitrary quasi-metric d measuring the distance between distributions. The quasi-metric d does not necessarily possess the standard characteristics of a metric; however, we assume that it is non-negative and satisfies a modified triangle inequality, i.e.,
This modified version of the triangle inequality is intimately linked to the relative entropy, and is used mainly for convenience; this will avoid repetitions when we study different metrics and should not be given much operational significance. In brief, we will use the modified triangle inequality as follows: we will pick an appropriate distribution P such that d(R, Q) is essentially on the order of d(P, Q), which depends on d, while the remaining terms that depend on relative entropies will be made negligible.
A. One-shot achievability analysis
We now develop one-shot random coding results for codes simultaneously ensuring channel reliability and channel resolvability. Given a DMC(X , W Y |X , Y) and a codebook with M codewords x 1 , · · · , x M ∈ X , our analysis of reliability is based on a threshold decoder [17] operating as follows. Given γ > 0 and a distribution Q Y on Y, and upon observing y, the decoder forms the estimate W = w of the transmitted message W if there exists a unique w ∈ 1, M such that
If there is no w satisfying (29), the decoder declares an error. It is known that the conditional probability of error when W = w is upper bounded by
w where
Under random coding,
w are independent, and we can therefore bound their average using well-known concentration inequalities. The following lemma upper bounds the expectation of (1) w and (2) w .
be a DMC and P X and Q Y be two distributions on X and Y. If we choose X 1 , · · · , X M independently according to P X , for all γ ∈ R and w ∈ 1, M , we have
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of [5, Lemma 3] or [17, Theorem 18] , but for completeness we provide the proof. We know that
Moreover, we have
Remark 2. In a second-order analysis, γ is generally chosen such that E
; we follow this approach as well, which is convenient since we have some flexibility in the bounding of the expected value of (1) w .
Next, we develop one-shot channel resolvability results. In our proofs, we treat the distance between induced output distribution and the desired distribution as a function of independently generated codewords, which allows us to prove a super-exponential concentration inequality in Lemma 2 using Mc Diarmid's Theorem. This may be viewed as an alternative approach to [9] and we recall this concentration inequality below for convenience.
Theorem 4 (McDiarmid's Theorem). Let X (X 1 , · · · , X n ) be a sequence of independent random variables defined on X . Furthermore, suppose g : X n → R is a function satisfying
Then, for all λ > 0, we have
Lemma 2. Consider a DMC (X , W Z|X , Z) and a distribution P X on X . If {x w } M w=1 ∈ X M are M 2 codewords and P Z is the corresponding induced distribution on Z, we define the functions g 1 , g 2 :
Moreover, if
Proof: We assume that P 1 Z and P 2 Z are the distributions induced by the codebooks
Next, for any two distributions P and Q, by [8, Lemma 2.7], we have
Therefore, we have
where (a) follows from the fact that x log(x/|Z|) is decreasing for 0 < x < |Z|/2. Accordingly, we obtain
Additionally, using Theorem 4, we obtain (51) and (52).
Lemma 3. Let (X , W Z|X , Z) be a DMC and P X be a distribution on X . If X 1 , · · · , X M are i.i.d. with distribution P X , and P Z (z) is the corresponding induced distribution on Z, we have
for all γ ∈ R where P Z (z) = x P X (x)W Z|X (z|x).
Proof: From [13, Equation 10], we know that
If we define the event E {(x, z) : log
γ}, then we get
Consider now the DMC (X , W Y |X , W Z|X , Y, Z) and a randomly generated code {X sw : s ∈ 1, K , w ∈ 1, M }. The next lemma leverages Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to guarantee that, with high probability, the entire code is a channel resolvability code for the channel W Z|X , and simultaneously, the subcode corresponding to every s ∈ 1, K is a channel reliability code for the channel W Y |X . Note that a code with these properties is not necessarily a covert code, but we show in the next sections how a careful choice of the random coding distribution leads to covertness.
Lemma 4. Consider a DMC (X , W Y |X , W Z|X , Y, Z) and two probability distributions P X and Q Y on X and Y. We sample codewords {X sw : s ∈ 1, K , w ∈ 1, M } independently according to P X . Moreover, for every λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 , γ 1 , and γ 2 > 0, we define events
Proof: We analyze the probability of each event separately. First, note that
P max
where (a) follows from Hoeffding's Inequality and the fact that
1M are independent random variables taking value in [0, 1] with mean F XY (γ 1 ), and (b) follows from Markov's Inequality. Furthermore, we have
where (a) follows from Lemma 3, and (b) follows from Lemma 2. Combining these inequalities, we get
Thus, we obtain
where (a) follows from the (85). Finally, (75) completes the proof.
B. Asymptotic results for covert communications
We now specialize the one-shot result of Lemma 4 to show the existence of covert codes for large blocklength n.
Theorem 5. Consider a sequence of distributions {P n X } n 1 where P n X is defined on X n and two sequences of natural numbers {M n } n 1 and {K n } n 1 . For a quasi-metric d and n large enough, if we have
then M * d (n, , δ) M n . Theorem 5 is useful in that it identifies sufficient conditions for the existence of codes. In particular, subsequent achievability proofs are reduced to choosing an appropriate sequence of random coding distributions {P n X } n 1 and verifying inequalities (90)-(93). We use both PPM and i.i.d. distributions, which we introduce and analyze precisely in Section III-C.
Proof: For a fixed n, we choose codewords X sw for s ∈ 1, K n and w ∈ 1, M n independently according to P n X . In Lemma 4, if we set
because of (90), we have with positive probability for n large enough
and with µ Z min z P Z (z)
where
where (a) follows because d is a quasi-metric, (b) follows from (93), and (c) follows from (98).
C. Covert distributions
In this section, we study specific "covert distributions," which we subsequently use to generate random codes and combine with Theorem 5. We first define the PPM distribution which was used in [4] for covert communication. Z,IID , respectively. Definition 3 ((n, )-PPM covert distribution). Given X = {0, 1} and n 1, we will define distribution P n, X,PPM on X n . If n = m + r for 0 r < , we partition the set 1, n into sets of size m and one set of size r. For simplicity, we consider the following partition: B i = {(i − 1)m + 1, · · · , im} for i ∈ 1, and B +1 = { m + 1, · · · , n}. Then, P n, X,PPM is the uniform distribution on the sequences with exactly one "1" in all B i for i ∈ 1, and no "1" in B +1 , i.e.,    x ∈ X n : ∀i ∈ 1, : j∈Bi x j = 1 and
We denote the output distribution of P n,
Y,PPM and P n,
X,IID is merely a Bernoulli product distribution, but we allow the parameter η to depend on n; note that a randomly generated sequence according to a covert distribution contains ηn 1-symbols, on average. The PPM covert distribution P n, X,PPM may be viewed as a way to generate structured constant composition codewords; specifically, every codeword generated according to P n, X,PPM contains exactly 1-symbols, each located in a window of size m, the quotient of the Euclidean division of n by . The structure of the PPM covert distribution plays a pivotal role in our analysis.
We devote the remainder of this section to the development of properties of covert distributions, which are geared towards the use of Theorem 5. We make repeated use of the Berry-Esseen Theorem, which we recall here for convenience.
Theorem 6 (Berry-Esseen Theorem). Let X 1 , · · · , X n be independent random variables s.t. for k ∈ 1, n we have
Proof: See [17, Theorem 44].
Lemma 5. Let (X , W Y |X , Y) be a binary-input DMC.
• If (X, Y) is distributed according to P n,
•
with C a constant that only depends on the channel.
Proof: When (X, Y) is distributed according to P n,
Y |X , we know that
where x 0 is an arbitrary element with P n,
Since channel is memoryless, by relabeling, we can assume without loss of generality that the support of x 0 is 1, . Hence, we have
where (a) follows from Theorem 6.
Var log
Lemma 6. For a binary-input DMC (X , W Y |X , Y), we have
Proof: To prove (122), we define m n/ . We first consider P 1,m X,PPM for which we have
Since P n, Y,PPM is the product of the distributions over different blocks, i.e. P n,
Moreover, (124) follows from [5, Equation (147)].
Lemma 7. Given a binary-input DMC (X , W Z|X , Z),
• if (X, Z) is distributed according to P n,η X,IID W ⊗n Z|X , then, for γ nηD Q , we have
for two positive constants C 1 and C 2 that depend on the channel.
Proof: When (X, Z) is distributed according to P n, X,PPM W ⊗n Z|X , for the random vector Z ∈ Z n , the first blocks of length m n/ are denoted by Z 1 , · · · , Z with Z i = (Z (i−1)m+1 , · · · , Z im ). Moreover, P Zi denotes the distribution of block Z i . Therefore, we have
where (a) follows from Hoeffding's Inequality with
and I(P 
Moreover, when (X, Z) is distributed according to P n,η X,IID W ⊗n Z|X , we define µ E log
, and L = max x,z log
Qη(z) . Therefore, by Bernstein's Inequality, we obtain
Notice that
where (a) follows from [5, Equation (12)] and
Using inequality log
If we assume that for all z ∈ Z, we have
which is less than 3η 2 s 2 for η small enough. Therefore, we have σ 2 η(U P + 3s 2 ). We finally get
Proof: If we define m = n , by [4, Lemma 1], we have for some constant C 1 , C 2 , and C 3
Lemma 9. For a DMC (X , W Z|X , Z) and η ∈]0, 1[, we have
Note that the constants behind O(.) are independent of η and just depend on the channel. Moreover, it refers to n → ∞ and η → 0.
Before proving this lemma, we state an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 10. For a DMC (X , W Z|X , Z) and η ∈]0, 1[, we have
Proof: If we define A(z)
and B(z) log (1 + ηA(z)), we have
Furthermore, we have
Therefore, we get
Likewise, we obtain
Accordingly, we have
Finally, with similar calculations, we get
Thus, Theorem 6 yields
Proof of Lemma 9: By definition of total variation and Lemma 10, we have
For β α Q ⊗n 0 , P n,η Z,IID , by the Neyman-Pearson Lemma, if for some γ we have
then
Hence, by choosing
we obtain
(207)
D. Converse
We now develop a generic converse for a quasi-metric d. The following result states that the number of covert and reliable bits that one can transmit may be characterized by establishing an upper bound on the weight of codewords. Such upper bounds are metric-specific, and we develop them in subsequent sections. 
Proof: Let C be an (M, K, n, , δ) d code. For s ∈ 1, K , we denote the sub-codebook of all codewords characterized by the key value s by C s . By our assumptions, we can choose D ⊂ C of size at least M K/n h satisfying (208). By the pigeonhole principle, there should be at least one sub-codebook
Since D s i is included in C s , it is a reliability code for the channel W Y |X with probability of error less than or equal to . Moreover, the type of the codewords in D 
Next, similar to [24] , by [17, Equation 102 ], we obtain for any γ > 0
However, we know that
By Theorem 6, we have
where B just depends on the channel. Setting γ = iD P + √ iV P Q −1 (1 − ) and combining all above equations, we have log |D
Hence, we obtain
Thus, we get
IV. COVERT COMMUNICATION WITH SPECIFIC COVERTNESS METRICS We now leverage the general results established in Section III and specialize them to study three covertness metrics: relative entropy (Subsection IV-A), variational distance (Subsection IV-B), and probability of missed detection (Subsection IV-C). As alluded to earlier, all that needs to be done is: (i) establish that the metric under consideration is a quasi metric, as defined at the beginning of Section III; (ii) verify that the conditions of Theorem 5 and Theorem 7 are satisfied.
A. Covertness in relative entropy
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 11. Relative entropy is a quasi-metric, i.e.,
Proof: Note that
Proof of Theorem 1 -Achievability: Fix ∈]0, 1[ and δ > 0, and define ω 2δ χ2(Q1 Q0) and n ω √ n − t where the value of t will be determined later. To use Theorem 5, we choose P n X P n, n X,PPM , and we set
By Lemma 8, we know that
where (a) is true for t and n large enough. Furthermore, by Lemma 6, we have
Hence, for large enough n, we have
where (a) follows from Lemma 5. By Lemma 7, we have
where (a) is true for large enough n. Thus, all the conditions in Theorem 5 hold, and we obtain
Proof of Theorem 1 -Converse: By [5, Equations (11) and (96)], for every (M, K, n, , δ) D code, we have
for some B > 0 depending on the channel. Thus, we can choose a subset of codewords of size M K/n such as D such that
Applying Theorem 7 completes the proof.
B. Covertness with variational distance
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 2.
Lemma 12. Total variation is a quasi-metric for distributions, i.e., for all distributions P , Q, and R defined over same set, we have
Proof: Total variation is a metric, and therefore we have
(a)
where (a) follows from Pinsker Inequality.
Proof of Theorem 2 -Achievability: Fix and δ in ]0, 1[, and define ω
and η n ω √ n − t n where the value of t will be determined later. To use Theorem 5, we choose P n X P n,ηn X,IID , and we set
By Lemma 9, we know that
where (a) is true for t large enough. Furthermore, by Lemma 6, we have
where (a) follows from Lemma 5. By Lemma 7, for some ζ > 0, we have
where (a) is true for large enough n. Thus, all conditions in Theorem 5 hold, and we obtain
To develop the converse for variational distance, we start by relating the variational distance V P Z , Q ⊗n 0 to the minimum weight of the codewords.
Lemma 13. Consider a binary-input DMC (X , W Z|X , Z) and M codewords x 1 , · · · , x M ∈ X n with induced distribution P Z on Z n . If w min min m∈ 1,M wt(x m ), then we have
where B is a constant that only depends on the channel.
Proof: To lower bound V P Z , Q ⊗n 0 , we introduce hypothesis testing problem with two hypotheses H 0 and H 1 corresponding to distributions Q ⊗n 0 and P Z , respectively. We know that for any test with probability of false alarm and missed detection α and β, respectively, we have
Hence, to link the variational distance to the weight of codewords, it suffices to introduce a test for which α and β conveniently relate to the weight of codewords. We consider here the sub-optimal test
where A(z)
and τ is an arbitrary constant that is determined later. Intuitively, this test plays the same role for DMCs as the radiometer played for Gaussian channels [2] in that it only depends on the codeword weight. To bound the probability of false alarm, we use Theorem 6 to obtain
Note that all above quantities are finite. For the probability of missed detection, we condition on the codeword transmitted by the channel to obtain
If we choose τ = nµ 0 + wmin 2 (µ 1 − µ 0 ), we have
Note that if we have σ 1 < σ 0 , then we get
Otherwise, we split the summation in (272) into two parts: if wt(x m ) > σ1 σ0 w min , then we have
where (a) follows from σ 1 > σ 0 . If w min wt(x m ) σ1 σ0 w min , then we obtain
for
> 0 where (a) follows from
for all 0 < y < x. Therefore, we always have
Moreover, plugging in the value τ in (266), we obtain
for some positive constant B 0 . Using (264), (280), and (281), we obtain
Finally, since µ 0 = 0 and σ
Next, we relate the weight of the codewords in a covert code to the channel characteristics and the specific amount of covertness measured in variational distance.
For all γ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a subset of codewords D such that |D| γM K and
where C is a constant that depends only on the channel.
Proof: We define
where C 2 > 0 is specified later and D {x ∈ C : wt(x) A √ n}. Clearly, D satisfies (284), and we just need to check |D| γM K. To this end, let P 1 and P 2 be the induced output distributions for codes D and C \ D, respectively. Then, we
where (a) follows from the definition of an (M, K, n, , δ) V code, (b) follows from the triangle inequality and
c) follows from Lemma 13, (d) follows from the definition of A, and (e) follows by choosing
Therefore, we get |D| γM K. Proof of Theorem 2 -Converse: In Lemma 14, if we set γ = 1 √ n , for any (M, K, n, , δ) V code, we have a subset of codewords D with |D| M K/ √ n and
Therefore, by Theorem 7, we have
C. Covertness with probability of missed detection at fixed significance level
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 3.
Lemma 15. For a fixed α ∈]0, 1[ and two distributions P and Q over same set Z, we define d(P, Q) 1 − α − β α (Q, P ); then d is a quasi-metric, and we have
Proof: By definition of β α (Q, R), there exists a set T with Q(T ) α and R(T ) = β α (Q, R); therefore we have
By Pinsker's Inequality, we obtain
Finally, using the definition of d(P, Q), we get the result. Proof of Theorem 3 -Achievability: If we choose ω =
, the remainder of proof is similar to the total variation case.
The proof of the converse of Theorem 3 requires the following steps similar to those of covertness with variational distance. We first relate the probability of missed detection β α Q ⊗n 0 , P Z at significance level α to the minimum weight of codewords.
Lemma 16. Consider a binary-input DMC
< w min min m∈ 1,M wt(x m ), we have
where B is a constant that depends just on the channel.
Proof: For the hypothesis testing problem consisting of two hypotheses H 0 with distribution Q ⊗n 0 and H 1 with distribution P Z , we introduce again the test
. Using Theorem 6 and the calculations in the proof of Lemma 13, we have
Thus, if we choose
, the false alarm probability would be less than or equal to α.
Hence, by definition of β α Q ⊗n 0 , P Z , we get Var Q1 (A(Z)).
Plugging in the value of τ , we obtain
Analogous to the proof of Lemma 13, we obtain 
Next, we develop an upper bound on the weight of codewords as a function of channel characteristics and covertness measured in terms of probability of missed detection. 
where C is a constant that depends just on the channel. 
Obviously, D satisfies (312), and we just need to check |D| γM K. To do so, let P 1 and P 2 be the induced output distributions for codes D and C \ D, respectively. Using Lemma 16 for C \ D, we get
where (a) follows from the definition of A and by choosing
This means that there exists T ⊂ Z n such that Q ⊗n 0 (T ) α and P 2 (T ) 1 − α − δ − γ. Accordingly, we have
where ( 
Therefore, by Theorem 7, we have log M * β (n, , δ, α)
V. STRONG CONVERSE FOR PROBABILITY OF ERROR
In this section, we briefly discuss how the second-order results can be exploited to obtain a strong converse for the probability of error in covert communication.
Theorem 8. Let d be a quasi-metric and (X , W Y |X , W Z|X , Y, Z) be a covert communication channel. We assume that for a function g : R → R and h > 0, the conditions in Theorem 7 are satisfied. Then, for δ > 0 and a sequence of codes {C n } n 1 , if C n is an (M n , K n , n, n , δ) d code with
then lim n→∞ n = 1.
Proof: If lim n→∞ n does not exist or is less than 1, there exists a sub-sequence {C n k } ∞ k=1 such that sup k n k < 1. Each C n k is an (M n k , K n k , n k , , δ) d code. Furthermore, (324) yields that lim inf
By Theorem 7, we know that
which means that lim sup
which contradicts with (325).
Note that the form of the first-order asymptotics developed earlier also shows that there is no strong converse for the covertness metric. If the amount δ of covertness is relaxed, more covert bits can be sent through the channel. This is unlike other situations in information-theoretic security, for which a strong converse seems to hold fairly generally for both secrecy and reliability [21] , [10] .
VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed the tools to study covert communication when covertness is measured with several "quasi-metrics," as defined in Section III. As discussed in Section V, in the absence of strong converse for the covertness metric, it is legitimate to ask which metric would make most sense from an operational perspective. While relative entropy is amenable to a fairly extensive information-theoretic analysis, as illustrated by our complete characterization of second-order asymptotics in Theorem 1, variational distance and probability of false alarm are probably more adequate since they directly relate to the operation of an adversary attempting to detect communication. Since measuring covertness in terms of variational distance does not impose any constraint on where the adversary operates on its ROC curve, we believe that variational distance is perhaps the metric of choice for covertness.
Our results are presently limited to binary-input DMCs, but extensions to arbitrary finite input alphabets do not present major difficulties by following the approach of [23] ; however several research questions remain open. We have not characterized the exact second-order asymptotics of covert communication with a variational distance and probability of missed detection metrics. We have also not characterized the second-order asymptotics for the number of key bits required. A close inspection of our current proof technique shows that we explicitly rely on a law of large numbers to analyze the number of key bits, which one would have to circumvent.
